The idea of building a “drone wall”, which gained momentum among European leaders after Russian drones entered Poland, may be a strategic mistake. Analysts argue that the real problem when it comes to European defence is not Russian attack drones, but the erosion of the foundations of NATO’s nuclear and conventional deterrence.
As a result of this erosion, Russia has the audacity to test the political will of the alliance by flying a drone over a NATO country. Experts say that over-investing in the “UAV Wall” would waste valuable resources that could be better spent on other defence priorities and would not deter Russia.
Why Russian Attack UAVs Are Not the Main Problem
A Shahid-type UAV launched by Russia from Kaliningrad could theoretically target European capitals. However, this is not Russia’s first strike capability in Europe. Since the 1950s, Russia has been able to threaten all of Europe from the air with ballistic and cruise missiles.
This is not the first time Russia has violated NATO airspace. The main problem lies in the nature of deterrence and the current geopolitical environment.
NATO’s main deterrence pillar since 1949 has been deterrence by punishment (the implicit threat of Article 5). This meant that in the event of an attack, the aggressor would be made to regret it, backed by the US nuclear arsenal. However, due to the policies and rhetoric of the Trump administration, some in Russia and Europe have begun to question the credibility of US nuclear deterrence. Since deterrence is a matter of perception, the very existence of this problem shows that deterrence is eroding.
Europe Needs to Invest in Retaliatory Capability
Europe needs to abandon the idea that it can continue to focus solely on defence, it says. While it is important not to actively escalate the conflict, it is emphasised that the technology to create a cost-effective “drone wall” does not currently exist anywhere in the world.
The Tomahawk Example: The rationale behind Ukraine’s desire to acquire Tomahawk cruise missiles is to gain the ability to damage the archer (production facilities/launching points in Russia) rather than just shoot down the arrows.
Deterrence: For Russia to think twice about sending Shahids to NATO, it must believe that the factories producing these UAVs will be destroyed. No military capability in your inventory will work as a deterrent if the enemy does not believe in your political will to use it.
Focus for the Future
What Europe needs to do now:
Conventional Force Reconfiguration: Rapidly restructure its conventional forces to respond to Russia, investing especially in long-range cruise strike capabilities.
Strengthening Nuclear Deterrence: Fulfil Article 3 of NATO and strengthen transatlantic relations by investing in retaliatory capabilities.
Not Focusing on the Wrong Threat: Increase the ability to counter the use of drones by clandestine actors (cyber attacks) or violent non-state actors, rather than focusing on a “wall” facing east.
If Europe focuses on its willingness and ability to respond to Russia, it will have to worry less about Russian aircraft and drones crossing its borders and attacking it.
